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Trust in the Indian Labour Diaspora* 
 
Dear Sirs, 
The bearer of this, Dhibby Deen, is a man of good character, who returns to his 
native country with a sum of money. His intention being to come back to 
Mauritius, we authorise you, should he apply to you for the cost of his passage, 
to pay the same at a rate not exceeding Co.’s Rs. 30, besides the cost of food as 
well as to any able-bodied men who may wish to accompany him, not exceeding 
50 in number, forwarding to us their receipt in duplicate for the sum paid.  
We remain, &c. 
Chapman Barclay 
Port Louis, Mauritius, 23 November 1840 
 
Dhibby Deen had originally travelled to Calcutta from Gorakhpur for service as a 
chaprasi [office messenger], but had instead been recruited as a ‘coolie’ worker for a 
sugar plantation in Mauritius. After completing a 5 year indenture contract he returned 
with 400 rupees in savings, and a certificate, together with a ‘general order to Colville, 
Gilmore & Co.’, a mercantile firm in Calcutta.1 The certificate from his employer 
(reproduced above), illustrates the critical role of informal networks and trust in the 
recruitment of Indians for indentured labour overseas. This paper investigates the role 
of such trust relationships through a re-examination of the activities of intermediaries 
(recruiters) in the Indian indentured labour system of the Indian ocean in the colonial 
era.  
Trust has been an influential strand in sociological thinking and in recent 
developmental discourse. The present study reviews its utilization in the literature of 
colonial subaltern migration and applies these insights to a specific historical context. 
Knowledge and information gained by indentured workers from recruiters, rather than 
the former’s blind faith in the latter, is key to understanding patterns in labour 
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mobilisation, particularly in the Indian Ocean region where levels of 
returnee/sirdari/kangani recruitment were significant.2 However, competition between 
returnee recruiters and local agents, rivalry between colonial governments, and 
competing discourses problematised and complicated the relationship between recruiter 
and recruit, adding further layers to the trust issue that need to be unpicked.  The paper 
concludes that informal trust networks are critical to an understanding of the operation 
of indenture, that the appraisal of their functioning and effectiveness necessitates the 
construction of a counter narrative to the ‘official’ archive, and suggests a new means of 
adapting the trust discourse to this field of study through an assessment of how these 
knowledge and information networks were disseminated by key mediators outside and 
beyond state-controlled infrastructures although not necessarily in conflict with them. 
 
The Concept of ‘Trust’ and its Applications in the Study of Indian Migration 
In sociological literature, trust is seen as especially important when there is an element 
of risk in an undertaking, as was most certainly the case in long-distance and overseas 
migration.3 Trust reduces complexity and inspires confidence. Trust can be reflexive in 
an individual relationship. It is also commonly negotiated in a collective where, for 
example, a group of workers have placed their confidence in a single leader or overseer. 
Both types of relationships are considered in this article. Confidence or ‘trust’ in 
institutions typically depends upon three types of determinants: the socio-economic 
characteristics and the personality traits of the individuals involved, the performance of 
the government, and the cultural environment.4 In developmental discourse, trust 
revolves around problems of illegality, corruption, and breaches of contract that 
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discourage investment. Indices of ‘trust’ are employed to demonstrate that where levels 
are low, development is stymied.  Institution building is commonly presented as a 
solution, in particular the shoring up of judicial institutions so as to ensure 
accountability and transparency in economic relations and the upholding of contracts. 
The answer in other words is conceived as lying entirely with the strengthening of the 
formal sector of the economy.  It assumes that arrangements to ensure the security of 
contracts are largely absent within the informal economy, which in the developing world 
accounts for the bulk of economic activity.5 The public discourse on ‘corruption’ is 
therefore represented as an ideological conflict between those advocating modern, 
formal methods of judicial enforcement, over the ‘moral economy’ which most often 
prevails in economic relationships.6 
 
Evidence of the breach of trust within the informal sector commonly comes to light 
through the formal judicial process. However, this paper will argue that these cases are 
not characteristic of, but rather constitute only a small element within a pyramid of 
personal networks and informal arrangements that worked to ensure the security of 
economic relationships. They come to light when parallel, informal methods of 
brokerage and arbitration break down and alternative remedies are sought to refine and 
restore the association. 
The application of trust to colonial contexts has been facilitated by developments 
in the theoretical literature which has challenged outdated views of centre and 
periphery.7 Across the British empire, as Natasha Glaisyer has shown, trust was required 
‘at every stage in the process of buying and selling goods. ‘Conceiving of empire as a set 
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of networks of trust, trade, and commercial information’ her work brings together the 
'small island' and the 'large empire.'  Linking diverse places this series of networks 
enable knowledge to be exchanged, commodities to be traded, trust negotiated and 
people to travel – albeit often involuntarily.8  The importance of ‘trust’ – the reliability 
of parties - in non-western settings has been evidenced by Peter Robb’s case study of Mr 
Upjohn’s circle in Calcutta. As he points out, 'Calcutta practices, such as trust, goodwill, 
privilege, and mutual support among networks of friends and allies, imply systems (not 
structures), including a specific ‘sense of limits’ within the ‘practical kinship’ of groups 
whose members thought about their unity, and hence an informal cultural code that 
disposed the members to certain motives and actions.’ His study also bears witness to 
the pragmatic ‘continual adjustments and exchanges’ that took place.9  Such research 
ties into the renewed interest in the history of emotions (or ‘emotionology’) within the 
historical discipline10, but it should not be confined to the realm of European elites. 
European merchants operating in India chose or were commonly obliged to include 
local Asian moneylenders and merchants in their circles of ‘trust’. Historians have 
likewise drawn attention to the extension of credit relationships to African merchants as 
a crucial factor in the maintenance and extent of the slave trade.11  The personal 
relationships based on trust between parties located in Bristol and Liverpool on the one 
hand and ‘Old Calabar’ on the other were naturally conducted through the use of 
intermediaries, whose actions could at any time damage the fiduciary character of the 
transactions. Additional mechanisms might be put in place to counteract adverse 
incidents and to offer additional guarantees. In the slave trading context, relatives of 
African dealers might be offered as ‘pawns’ to ensure that slaves would be supplied in 
return for goods delivered, and in riposte it sometimes happened that a sailor would be 
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seized to ensure the release of a ‘pawn’. 12  Where trading relationships on trust broke 
down, the repercussions could be long-lasting. 13 
 
As was the case for transactions between European merchants in Britain and 
slave dealers in Africa, the reliance on intermediaries was important to the management 
of subaltern migration streams from India.  During the colonial period it was common 
for Indian migrants, whether convicts, or indentured labourers to view themselves as 
‘Company ke naukar’ [servants of the company].14 At a time when a private organisation 
– the East India Company – was effectively governing large swathes of overseas British 
territories, it is not difficult to understand how ‘company’ could become synonymous 
with ‘government’. This paper looks at how concepts such as naukari could be used and 
abused within competing and parallel systems of labour migration. Drawing upon 
evidence of conflicts surrounding the mobilisation and recruitment of Indian migrant 
labourers sourced from official archives, newspapers and selected published studies, we 
offer a new methodology for understanding trust in the indenture context by focussing 
on the important role informal relationships played in the mobilisation of subaltern 
Indians for overseas labour, particularly in the Indian Ocean, from where the examples 
used here are drawn. The methodological framework takes account of the difficulties 
faced by such networks when forced to operate within or alongside a state-controlled 
migration process. Despite the obstacles and obstruction faced, it is argued that 
informal networks of trust to operate and were often more effective in their functioning 
than official documentation, and the literature which continues to be over-reliant on 
them, would suggest. It is wildly orientalist to assume that workers were only ever 
driven by fear and deprivation. To avoid this, it is crucial, we contend, to read across the 
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grain of the colonial archive to tease out the informal networks which determined the 
ebb and flow of labour across the Indian Ocean world and further afield to the 
Caribbean and Pacific islands.  
 
Personal Relationships, Recruiting Networks and the Operation of Naukari 
Naukari is a Hindi term that traditionally refers to long-distance service, such as in the 
British East India Company’s Army in early nineteenth century India.15 Overseas 
military service is an important precursor to indenture. The first indentured migrants 
were encouraged to see the long-distance recruitment for employment in the British 
empire as an extension of the ‘naukari’ military-type service already familiar to the 
villagers of northern India. Convict migrants also adopted the term, perhaps preferring 
to align themselves to workers and sepoys recruited for overseas ‘service’ rather than as 
forced labour.16  This section discusses the application of ‘trust’ in the context of 
subaltern Indian migration through the evolution and practice of naukari.  
 
The extent to which the British Indian army was derived from and in turn 
impacted upon the militarised and mobile peasant society of northern India has been 
underscored by the influential studies of Dirk Kolff, Seema Alavi, Douglas Peers and 
David Omissi, among others.17 Sepoys joined the army for pecuniary benefits, but their 
willingness to do so also relied upon local martial traditions in which the concept of 
honor was a key component of subaltern identity. These studies underscore the extent to 
which the sepoys themselves were active in reinforcing and deriving their own benefits 
from the prevailing ideology, thereby creating their own networks of information and 
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agency.18  Self-selection though family, kin and caste ties was a two-way process of trust 
whilst the expensive wars waged in India in the second half of the 18th century by the 
East India Company provided opportunities for the most oppressed groups in Indian 
society – the Kamia of Bihar or Pallans and Paraiyans of southern India - to escape 
agrestic servitude by enlisting as sepoys.19  
The relationships of trust which evolved between sepoys and the company were 
tested by the mobilization of volunteer battalions for overseas campaigns during the 
period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars [1789-1811]. The successful 
recruitment of troops and followers for the overseas expedition from India against the 
Mascarene islands in 1810 is a case in point. A first convoy, totalling 1700 Europeans 
and 1800 natives, left Madras on the 8th May 1810, and was considered ‘a strong proof of 
their attachment to the service, and of their confidence in the British Government’.20 A 
second convoy was organised from Bengal in August and September 1810 with the 
volunteers being promised bounty money, promotions and a prompt return to India 
after the termination of the engagements.21 The Calcutta Morning Post reported on the 
embarkation of the sepoys and commented on the measures in place to ensure that 
difficulties arising from caste-based restrictions were minimized:  
It is gratifying to observe, that the prejudices of the Native soldiers, against all service on board of 
ship or in countries beyond the seas, has, within these few years, been so completely overcome, 
that such occasions of active employment are now sought for by the sepoys as a matter of honour 
and distinction. …  One great difficulty attending the employment of sepoys on such service, has 
very lately been removed, by the arrangements which were adopted for enabling them to cook 
their victuals on board the transports.22 
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In many respects, recruitment strategies for indentured migrants from the 1830s 
onwards replicated those set up for sepoys. The rewards system is echoed in the 
bounties paid to sirdars and returnee recruiters under indenture, for example: ‘in times 
of urgency… reward money was allowed to native soldiers who voluntarily exerted 
themselves to bring in fresh recruits or a reward in the form of promotion was given. In 
addition, recruiting parties were occasionally sent out, with the approval of the 
Commander-in-chief, and native commissioned officers and sepoys were granted leave 
of absence to recruit men from their native villages.’23 Dirk Kolff has argued that ‘there 
was no lack of men opting for a life spent as errant soldier, migrant labourer, or pack-
animal trader,’ and suggests that a good understanding of the traditions of ‘naukari’ 
demonstrates the flaws in ‘a historiographical tradition that traces the Indian contract 
labour diaspora to fraud and famine’.24 Rajesh Rai has also sought to demonstrate how 
an earlier  'migration' of Hindustanis to Singapore, the outcome of a labour movement 
tied to the colonial militia and a forced movement of Indian 'convicts' to the penal 
colony, facilitated the development of a circular migration system of 'free migrants' 
through movements to and from their villages of origin'.25 
Habituated to travel, sepoys were to be found among the early contingents of overseas 
indentured labour. There is much anecdotal evidence to indicate that sepoys viewed 
indenture as another form of naukari. Rengasamy Naicken, who went to Mauritius in 
the 1830s, had been a sepoy at the Danish settlement at Tranquebar, before travelling to 
Singapore to pay a visit to his brother resident there. This trip lasted for one year, after 
which he ended a period of unemployment following a meeting with an acquaintance 
whom he describes as a man of the Vellala caste from Karrical. ‘He said he was going to 
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Mauritius and desired me to follow him. I consented to it and went along with him to 
Karrical.’ The reflexive trust established between the two men clearly provided the 
confidence necessary to undertake the potentially hazardous journey to the far side of 
the Indian ocean. Manick, a former sepoy of the ‘Indre ka pultun’ (52nd Bengal Native 
Infantry) decided to migrate inspired by the belief that he was continuing in the service 
of the British ‘sahib log ka kotee’ [government or company work].26 Boodhoo Khan, a 
self-described Pathan of Gya, had previously served as a sepoy with the Rajah of 
Morbaugh. Having obtained his discharge, he was immediately recruited for colonial 
labour, and brought to Calcutta.  His brother, Sheer Khan, a sepoy at Alipore, sought to 
dissuade him from making the journey to Mauritius to which Boodhoo responded “this 
is the Company’s service, and why should I refuse it?’ 27  
The presence of sepoys or of men who had been rejected for or discharged from 
military service in the early streams of migrants embarking for the sugar colonies was 
well known to the authorities. The Collector of Rajahmundry gave specific details of 
labourers who had embarked for Mauritius between 1st June 1837 and 25th August 1838, 
describing them as ‘composed in some measure of men, who would have engaged as 
Sepoys had they not been undersized or prevented by some defect, which rendered them 
ineligible. A few discharged Sepoys have also gone’ along with weavers, servants, lascars 
and agricultural labourers.28 In February 1841, a magistrate in Calcutta took it upon 
himself to question a group of returning labour migrants who had disembarked from the 
Graham. He found their attitudes and explanations in keeping with other seasonal 
migrants, explaining them as conforming to ‘the habits of the sepoy caste, the bearer 
 10 
caste, and many others … the latter take service in Calcutta and the Lower Provinces, 
and return to their homes after several, sometimes five years’ absence.’ 29   
Lascars, or seamen, are the other subaltern group whose experience of entering into 
relationships of trust to undertake long sea voyages, speaks directly to the indenture 
experience and can be seen as both a precursor of, and running parallel to the broader 
system of Indian labour migration. 30 It is no surprise, therefore, to find that 
recruitment for new types of labour tended to exploit existing traditions of employment 
in military or seagoing professions.31 Naukari customs facilitated the incorporation of 
such men and women into the empire-wide mobilization of South Asian labour, 
especially in the decades following the abolition of slavery. The following sections will 
detail more specifically the mechanics through which trust was factored into the 
contractual arrangements set up for indentured workers and assess how flaws in the 
official framework regulating migration were countered and circumvented. 
 
The Mechanics of Trust: Regulatory institutions and official documentation 
In the 1830s, recruitment of indentured labourers for Mauritius, Réunion and British 
Guiana was conducted as a private speculation by mercantile houses who employed a 
network of local recruiters termed arkatis and duffadars in north India and mestrys / 
maistries in south India. In mobilizing these workers, recruiters sought to build upon 
local traditions of long-distance and seasonal labour migration practices. Recruits would 
be passed along to one or more intermediaries and often held for days or weeks at 
godowns in port towns and cities before being shipped.  Abuses were rife, and 
reformists were able to highlight shocking allegations of kidnapping and forced 
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confinement.  The trust that migrants had invested in a system which they had been led 
to believe was naukari, or state-sponsored was accordingly diminished.32  
From the 1840s onwards, the merchant-controlled labour streams were 
reinforced, mitigated or replaced with a state funded machinery of employees and 
institutions, bolstered by a series of legislative acts that regulated virtually all aspects of 
recruitment, transportation and policing of indentured labourers from village to 
overseas plantation. Emigration agents, protectors of emigrants and immigrants, 
customs officers and magistrates, ships’ doctors and depot surgeons were employed to 
superintend the flow of labour to an increasing number of destinations that ultimately 
included Fiji, South Africa, Trinidad, Guadeloupe, and Martinique and a number of 
other Caribbean islands.33  The setting up of this regulatory machinery was designed to 
invest the indenture system with safeguards both to minimise unfavourable 
comparisons with the now discredited slave trade and to render the operation more 
trustworthy for administrators and practitioners alike.  In the process, a vast and 
bureaucratic operation of regulation and documentation was created. Government 
notices [see Figure 1] posted in recruiting districts advised prospective migrants of the 
terms and conditions on offer, to increase the confidence of recruits. Labour contracts 
were signed before a magistrate, to guarantee the rights of the worker as well as his/her 
duties towards the employer [see Figure 2] and receipts issued for remittances 
deposited. 34 
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Figure 1: Government Notice to Indians                  Figure 2: Sample Contract, 1839 
Going To Mauritius   
Source: National Archives of Mauritius       Source: National Archives of Mauritius  
 
Institutions were likewise an important part of the official infrastructure. Depots 
set up at the ports of embarkation and arrival provided migrants with a place to stay 
while awaiting transportation to and from their places of employment and these sites 
together with the officials who staffed them represented further evidence of indenture as 
a government sanctioned service. These institutions also functioned, of course, as 
convenient locales for the policing of migrants. Medical examinations could take place 
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there and recruits could be registered and issued with certificates and other 
documentation. Increasingly the immigration depots in the receiving colonies also 
became sites for the policing of migrants, where individuals would be photographed and 
issued with tickets and where vagrants might be incarcerated pending deportation or 
redeployment [Figure 3].35 
 
                  Figure 3: The enclosed courtyard of the Immigration Depot at Mauritius 
     Source: Illustration from the Mauritius Commercial Bank collection, reproduced in Voyage II 
Mauriciana (Reunion: Musee Villele, 2005) 
 
 The regulation, documentation and institutional infrastructure of indenture 
helped to maintain trust in the notion that overseas labour migration was an avenue of 
socio-economic mobility even through lengthy periods of depression and wage 
stagnation. The well-educated Munshi Rahman Khan who included details of his 
indentured service in his posthumously published autobiography, described his 
enlistment for work in Surinam in terms of agreeing to take naukari [government 
service], and recruiters continued to open discussions with the question ‘naukari loge’? 
[do you want naukari?] throughout the 19th century. 36 However, the trust in 
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government run migration schemes was only one element in the equation. Alongside the 
commercial and official recruiting network, was a personalized, informal web of links 
and ties which, while not always accessible through the colonial archive, is key to 
understanding the maintenance and evolution of indenture in established locales. 
 
The Evolution of Trust: informal networks of recruitment and migration 
The government-operated indenture system, initially set up to bolster the 
trustworthiness of the scheme, metamorphosed over time into a set of regulations 
devised as much to police as to protect the migrant. This evolution of the mechanics of 
state involvement in Indian labour migration, and its abuse, fostered, in turn, the 
development of means to subvert the instruments of central control, by and on behalf of 
the migrants themselves.  Often abetted by individual employers and overseers 
[sirdars], informal networks operated within or alongside the official machinery. The 
return of trusted employees [often sirdars] to India to recruit family and friends was a 
widespread informal mechanism through which indentured labour mobilization could 
be facilitated to the more popular and well-known destinations.  The toleration of some 
aspects of this parallel informal network on the part of emigration agents and protectors 
generated in turn various kinds of documentation that survive in the colonial archive.  
The note given to Dhibby Deen (introduction) is one example.  
A similar ‘good conduct’ certificate was given to Ramdeen, formerly a syce [groom, or 
stable hand], who had embarked as a ‘coolie’ and returned as a sirdar to Calcutta aboard 
the ship ‘John Bagshaw’ on 10 December 1840. This document, written in the French 
language by the employer Thomy Rudelle stated ‘I certify that the named Ramdine has 
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always shown zeal and care in his work during the time he was in my employment on ‘La 
Baraque’ establishment’ [Figure 4]. A similar certificate was issued to another of his 
returning labourers, named Raccana; this may be compared to an employer’s reference 
issued today, signifying the importance of trust in the new contractual relationship 
which had evolved between employer and employee, but one which is seldom discussed 
in the indenture literature. 37 
 
Figure 4: Good Conduct Certificates for Ramdine and Raccana 
Source: British Parliamentary Papers, 1841 [45], Calcutta Commission of Enquiry, Appendices 
 
The informal network of returnee-accompanied migration offered recruits an 
additional layer of security, which was a useful means of establishing trust in the early 
phases of migration to a particular territory. Emigrants would in most cases be unable to 
read the contracts they signed or the certificates handed to them; ‘old hands’ who 
travelled with them on the ‘coolie’ ships were more readily identifiable. Similarly, 
relationships developed on board – the so-called jehaji bhai or ship brotherhood – 
could lead to lasting and significant friendships.38 In 1843 the emigration agent at 
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Madras, Captain C. Biden, discussed the concerns of a group of migrants engaged by a 
maistry named Ramasawmy, who had embarked ‘at Pondicherry for the Mauritius 
about 4½ years ago, and he has now returned to India without his family expressly for 
the purpose of engaging coolies for the Mauritius.’ The emigrants he had recruited were 
described as ‘all willing and even anxious to be passed for the Mauritius but on the first 
day of the examination a difficulty arose over the time required to serve at the Mauritius 
to entitle them to a free passage back to India’. Ramasawmy had informed the men both 
of the rate of pay they would receive and of the fact that they would be entitled to a free 
passage back to India after a service of one year at the Mauritius. The migrants wished 
the Maistry's statement to be confirmed by the government agent. Once it was explained 
to them that the free return passage could not be guaranteed before five years, and that 
rates of pay would be set in Mauritius, there was some initial confusion, and it was not 
until the next day that the migrants returned and expressed themselves willing to 
migrate. 39 
Ramasawmy’s story offers an interesting case study of the operation of the 
mechanics of indenture in both formal and informal settings. He described himself  as ‘a 
native of Chevolpoottoor, a village in the Zillah of Trinnavelly’, and explained that 
following a quarrel with his father Moottoo Caroopa Pillay, a conicopoly40 for the district 
tehsildar [revenue officer] he went to Madura ‘where a cooly maistry, named 
Caroopanen, engaged me to proceed to the isle of France as a labourer and took me to 
Pondicherry, where one Mootoo Naik, a Merchant, got me registered at the Police 
Office; after which I signed a document, engaging to serve a French Gentleman at the 
Mauritius, as a labourer for 5 years, on a salary of 5 rupees a month, besides Batta and 
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two cloths a year. Moottoo Naik then sent me to Cuddalore, with 200 other men and 36 
women. On the 26th day of the month of Cartigay [November 1838], we were embarked 
on a ship bound to the island.’ Ramasawmy worked in sugar cane cultivation, married 
on Mauritius and had two children. Interviewed after his return to India in 1842, he 
explained, ‘the time of my engagement is not yet expired but my employer has sent me 
back to get 200 labourers, promising to give me 2 rupees for every individual I procure; 
he gave me a letter to the address of Messrs Hall and Bainbridge at Madras, with 
direction to draw on these gentlemen as much as I may require to hire labourers.’ 41  The 
experience of Ramasawmy provides a clear demonstration of the development of a 
relationship of confidence between employer and recruiter, the latter being entrusted to 
draw funds upon Indian merchants to meet the costs of recruitment. Ramasawmy had 
also developed a good working relationship with his employer, a French planter, 
explaining that he was ‘a good gentleman, he was most kind to all the labourers, but 
particularly to me, for I did my duty to please him – he never stopped any of our pay on 
any account.’ Ramasawmy had saved 200 rupees from his labour which he had left in 
the care of his wife at Mauritius. 
So well entrenched did the informal system of returnee and sirdari recruiting 
directly for employers become, that by the 1860s legislation had been enacted in 
Mauritius to enable overseas planters to make formal requisitions for a specific number 
of workers and to send a named individual to collect those workers,  and accompany 
them through the depot, onto the ship and onwards to the plantation. The degree of 
trust involved in these transactions is evident from the large sums disbursed to such 
individuals who were now designated ‘special recruiters’.42  Employers who had become 
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accustomed to workers of a specific ethnic group could now actively request their 
intermediaries to recruit among their local networks. This in turn facilitated the 
development of a sense of community on estates as regional clustering was thereby 
accelerated.43 In these respects sirdari or returnee recruiting has significant aspects in 
common with the kangani style recruitment from India to plantations in Ceylon and 
Malaya in the same period.  Sinnappah Arasaratnam has described ‘kangani’ as: 
  a person who was himself an immigrant working on the plantation as a foreman, or even as 
a labourer of some influence and standing. The employer would send him to India provided 
with money, to go to his village and district and recruit labourers among his own people. He 
was empowered to pay the passage and all other expenses connected with the migrants’ 
departure…. There was now scope for the migration of families rather than individuals... 
When the kangany returned to Malaya with his group of labourers and delivered them to his 
employer, they were employed in that plantation, usually under the kangany who had 
recruited them. 44 
This method of recruiting labourers to the mutual advantage of all parties could not 
have worked well unless the government functionaries charged with superintending 
indentured migration were prepared to work with the returnees and not against them. 
Inevitably the parallel operation of informal and formal recruiting networks led to 
competition and clashes which in turn could damage the trust relationship between 
returnee or sirdari recruiters and their recruits.  
 
The Breakdown of Trust in Labour Recruitment 
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A common problem described by both recruits and returnee recruiters derived from the 
competing recruitment networks operating at the ports of embarkation and other 
centres in India. In 1847, it was reported that an employee in the Mauritius depot at 
Calcutta, known as ‘Teeluck Babu’, had been in the habit of extracting bribes of 10 to 15 
rupees from ‘old immigrants’ [as returnees were known] and even larger sums from men 
‘sent up by planters to recruit’. Consequently, returnee recruiters were taking steps to 
conceal their identity, having brought their bands to the depot for embarkation.45  
Employees of the formal recruitment network not only competed with and sought to 
subvert the informal ties between returnees and new migrants but also in some cases co-
opted such individuals to work alongside them. In Calcutta return emigrants were in 
some cases directly employed by emigration agents.46 When Bombay was reopened to 
emigration in the early 1850s, the first step taken by the Mauritius authorities was to 
dispatch there ‘50 to 60 natives of that Presidency’ for the purpose of gathering new 
recruits.47  Similar problems were experienced at Madras, where a group of exasperated 
emigrants complained that returnee recruiters had been co-opted en masse to work at 
the behest of the local formal recruiting agents: 
‘We are poor and distressed people mostly cultivators of the interior  countries, resolved to 
embark for the Mauritius for the purpose of bettering our circumstances … There are nearly 
70 maistries, deputies, under maistries, and collectors in men and women, the whole from 
Pondicherry come for the sole purpose of this traffic, they are all old hands who have robbed 
many thousands of poor fellows…. If we are suffered to come and register ourselves it would 
be of very great advantage to us, but the evil of being passed from one hand to another cuts 
us short of 6 or 7 rupees …  we are  all kept in darkness, cheated to their heart's content and 
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then shipped off without the means of putting one quarter of a rupee into the hands of 
parting friends and relatives who come from distant places to bid us farewell.’ 48 
In some cases recruiters might exploit the system to misrepresent the employer 
or place where a migrant wished to go, for personal gain. Veeram, working in Malaysia 
as a ‘road coolie’ addressed a letter of grievance to the Resident of Selangor in 1911 
complaining of a kangani in India who had cheated his wife and sister, who were seeking 
to rejoin him, by falsely declaring the he was under engagement to an estate and sending 
them there. The Manager of the estate was unwilling to break their formal contracts to 
him, on the basis of their informal ties elsewhere.49 The incompatibility of verbal 
agreements made between individuals seeking to rejoin relatives with the legal contracts 
they were obliged to sign to effect the transfer, is again underscored. 
Such problems could not effectively be solved while the official recruitment 
system operated in competition with the informal networks, especially where 
intermediaries were offered extra remuneration in the form of bribes to breach the 
verbal agreements made with migrants.  The evidence of continuing issues on this front 
emerged in 1883 when a group of recruiters who worked in Calcutta, India addressed a 
letter to the Protector of Immigrants in Mauritius: 
We the undersigned recruiters of the Mauritius Depot, beg to inform your worship's notice 
that at present we are in great difficulty by the departure of the Emigration Agent of the 
place.  The said Agent was in habit of asking every recruiter and emigrants about their 
condition and the treatment of the office Baboos [clerks].  From the time of his departure we 
are in great oppression the reason is this that the Baboos named Ishan Jogeadro and Umbica 
often charge per cooly rupee one at the time of embarkation. The ration of the coolies are also 
given by them, the coolies are not sufficiently fed for they deduct from their ration and keep 
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for their own benefit. …. If any recruiter goes to Baboos the Baboo says to give up your 
licence and so the recruiter postponed their work for the Baboos get their benefit from the 
extra work of supplying rations, clothes and do not care the government works, and as the 
ship delays for embarkation, and if the clerks Umbica and Ishan will remain in their situation 
no one will be able to recruit.50 
Where recruiters lacked support from local officials, or where they were relatively 
powerless in the face of entrenched local interests, the trust relationship with the recruit 
could be adversely affected.  Samita Sen’s research on the 'garden sirdars' in Assam is 
one of many examples that serve to indicate how abuses in recruitment for certain 
territories or industries could lead to an enduring break down of trust.  In the case of 
Assam, although officials agreed that using ex-workers to recruit other labourers was a 
good idea, they were frequently subverted and bribed by professional recruiters and 
allegedly used their local connections in the villages merely to cheat people.51 
Further complicating factors in the establishment and maintenance of the trust 
relationship in indentured recruiting centre around the competing discourses which 
impacted on legislative intervention and control of the system.  Planter and reformist 
agendas, competition between colonial powers over the control and representation of 
migration, and later nationalist agitation represent a few of the several areas in which 
propaganda was used as a tool to influence attitudes to indenture and had the potential 
or indeed actually adversely impacted upon the establishment of trust between recruit 
and recruiter.52 Reformists played a useful role in helping to curb over-enthusiastic 
representations on the part of overseas planters as to the work opportunities on offer, 
but they were equally likely to have an adverse impact. One example of circumstances in 
which the arguments and activities of reformists could impact on the life chances of 
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migrants was revealed by a petition addressed by 12 worried immigrants to the 
Governor of Mauritius in 1841.  Having made their way to the island from Pondicherry, 
they were informed that their arrival was in breach of an order banning the recruitment 
of agricultural labourers. This ban had been put in place as a result of pressure from the 
Anti Slavery Society in Britain and reformist supports in India, but had adverse 
consequences for informal recruitment streams already in place and particularly for 
families seeking to rejoin kin already overseas.  The twelve would-be migrants protested 
against the prohibition which ‘amounts to starvation for them.’ 53   
 That negative publicity surrounding indentured migration could have an adverse 
impact on the trust relationship between returnees and prospective recruits, is 
demonstrated with particular clarity in South Africa where a scheme to send successful 
sirdars to recruit in India coincided with a nationalist anti-indenture campaign. Sirdar 
Muthusamy had collected 7 Indians in his village when another sirdar from Natal 
arrived there and informed the villages of ‘the present agitation in Natal’.  
He warned the villagers to take care of their children chiefly young women. He 
made the people believe that some sirdars are purposely come to India to take 
away from their kith and kin, some young women of fair complexion to get rich 
husbands in Natal, and thereby get some large amount. This was a talk all over. 
Muthusamy’s evidence revealed the very real dangers faced by returnee recruiters where 
local magistrates joined in the hostility to overseas migration: ‘One day the village 
magistrate sent for me and I went. He told me that I shall be held responsible if any 
persons were missing in the village and that I should not speak to any women during my 
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stay. All this discouraged me. I resolved to abandon the idea of recruitment.’ Sirdar 
Periya Gengadu was amazed at the power of the anti-indenture propaganda: 
I was really astonished to see my close relations and intimate friends holding 
aloof. Vernacular pamphlets announcing the arrival of one hundred Natal sirdars 
to take away all the villagers to an unknown country were distributed to the 
public … 15 men who were negotiating with me privately to emigrate changed 
their minds and absconded at Ramapuram railway station. This made the 
situation worse. The villagers began to suspect me. The village magistrate put a 
guard on me … Seeing all these difficulties, I begged of my wife to go with me to 
Natal. After a deliberate consideration she agreed. She also influenced 3 Indians. 
I became sick on account of the worry on all sides.’ 54 
Analyses of indenture and related forms of subaltern migration from India thus need to 
take account of the role and strength of pressure groups and international political 
events, which inevitably colour the perspectives and attitudes of groups involved in 
formal and informal labour mobilization activities. 
 
Intermediaries and Trust in the Workers’ World 
Once the migrants reached their destination, their renumeration and conditions of work 
depended upon a network of trust between them, the sirdar/kangani, and the planters. 
The payment of wages and monetary transactions provide a fertile ground from which to 
look at these dynamics, and indicate that alongside or outside the world of the written 
contract, many other arrangements were in place that were in many cases of greater 
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import to the labourer. The sirdar/kangani held great responsibility for the wages of his 
labourers. For example, he could retain a portion of their monthly wages as a form of 
saving on their behalf. This could then be returned when they wished to send money 
home, were returning to India, or if they became ill and their pay was docked. The 
intermediary was also known to lend money at a price for special purposes, such as for 
the marriages of labourers or of family back home. Perhaps one of the most 
authoritative functions the sirdar/kangani could have was the pooling of labourers’ 
wages to then divide and redistribute. The levels of trust required for such activities are 
self-evident. The pooling of wages could work to the advantage of the workers, ensuring 
that any punishment deductions made by planters against an individual could be 
rendered ineffective.  
In surviving records it is common for sirdars/kanganis to be maligned by planters 
who were sceptical of their motivations, this clearly in part arose from competition 
between the planter/state and the intermediaries for influence over the labourers, in 
which trust was an important factor. One official in Mauritius commented:  
‘The competition now existing between the planter and the job-contractor, 
who is generally some old Sirdar, who has acquired influence over his 
comrades, and induced them on the expiration of their first engagement to 
place themselves under his orders, is now altogether in favour of the latter, 
who is always able to offer higher wages, exemption from discipline and 
continual leave of absence, with the same guarantee to the laborer for the 
payment of his wages.’55 
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Allegations of workers being ‘crimped’ or lured away from one estate or employer to 
another can seem like a simple betrayal of trust on the part of the intermediary but may 
in fact be more indicative of the loss of control by the planter and the recourse to his 
ally, the magistrate, to re-affirm that authority.  Thus, the petition of Samyiah and 
Kurpanan, charged with crimping coolies from a Malaysian estate can be read either as 
testimony of the bad faith of the former, or a state punishment for their undue 
influence, or thirdly, as they themselves contended, a completely erroneous prosecution 
of independent men who were simply visiting relatives on the estate. 56 
The bad reputation given to sirdars by the complaints of colonial planters can 
sometimes be explained away as arising from genuine concerns resulting from cultural 
ignorance and misunderstanding. It was often rather an indication of displeasure at the 
influence the sirdar wielded, particularly when this was seen as undermining measures 
put in place by the planters. A clear example of this emerges in July 1840, when two 
sirdars were dismissed from the service of a Mademoiselle Bestel by Magistrate Pearce. 
He found that they had:  
headed and excited a riotous meeting of the Indian labourers in her service, on which 
occasion another sirdar was hung in effigy ... and the whole property in the worst state of 
disorder for 24 hours.  [Sirdar Goordial was said to have] given the worst advice to the 
men under his orders, telling them not to work so fast, and that if they made 30 cane 
holes they would get their 5 rupees and would get no more if they made 60. 57  
The Royal Commission of 1875 which investigated the functioning of the indenture 
system on Mauritius contains ample evidence of ill feeling towards sirdars, with several 
planters describing their moneylending activities and other means used by them of 
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retaining wages of the labourers.58  However, it is the complaints of labourers 
themselves about such activities that offer the most compelling evidence that some 
allegations of malpractice on the part of intermediaries were not unfounded.  The power 
held by sirdars certainly created opportunities for them to line their own pockets. The 
petition of Maha Lingam and his wife Suparnah, coolies on the coffee estate of Mr 
Meikle, in Malaysia, thus declared themselves so burdened by the unjust exactions of 
one Nagamalay kangani, that they requested free passages to India to escape the misery 
of life at his hands of their extortioner who had effectively rendered them ‘penniless, 
homeless and on the verge of starvation’. The formal infrastructure of protection offered 
them no succour. The petition was viewed by the Resident who replied coldly that ‘their 
remedy lies in application to the Court and that he is unable to render the pecuniary 
assistance asked for.’59  All the regulations in the world could evidently not save the 
weak who were preyed on by the unscrupulous.  Their case was not an isolated one. The 
coolies of Kuala Langat addressed a collective petition against the overseer 
Supramaniam of Kalthiath, accusing him of a litany of offences against them, including: 
He supplies rice to coolies and receives their wages on the pay day, rendering false 
accounts; He engages daily Immigrant coolies named Nagappan and Munian to drive his 
own carts and charges them in the check roll. For looking after his cows and selling milk 
outside he has got the cooly Arumugathan who is also charged in the check roll. He has 
engaged a women named Veeramah to bring water to his house from Matagh Bazaar. 
This women and five or six others are entered in the check roll. These are engaged for 
collecting firewood, cutting grass for the cattle. He separated Papayee the wife of Marapa 
Kanda a stone breaking coolie and given her to Murugasoo on receipt of $30. … On 
account of the injustice, cruel deeds and bad character we cannot bear any more and will 
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run away. If this overseer is sent elsewhere and another overseer takes this place then we 
will work. 60 
On this occasion, some account was taken of the petition but the overseer received no 
punishment other than to be transferred elsewhere.   
Alongside the litany of complaints, from planters and labourers alike, there were 
dissenting voices regarding the position of the intermediary in the world of the colonial 
labour migrant. Abuse of the sirdar-labourer relationship went both ways according to a 
Mauritian planter, Mr Wiehe: ‘it is supposed that sirdars cheat the men, and to a certain 
extent that is true; but … the men also managed to get money out of the sirdars … and 
sirdars have frequently complained to him that these men have gone off without 
repaying them’. Another planter, Mr Antelme, explained that sirdars sometimes loaned 
money without interest to keep their men in the gang and obtain their re-engagement, 
and that ‘they are the real sufferers by any delay in wage payments’, further while sirdars 
did indeed often receive double rations, this was ‘so that absentees who lose their wages 
and rations can obtain food from the sirdar’.61   
Sirdars who kept their gangs together often played their most crucial role at the 
end of the period of indenture by persuading workers to stay on, rather than return 
home, and negotiating for them betters terms and conditions in the light of the skills 
they had acquired,  whilst at the same time earning a benefit for themselves. Thus W.W. 
West, a British owner of the Vale plantation Mauritius in 1845 stated that he had not 
been able to re-engage any men, despite offering an increase of wages: ‘The employment 
of sirdars is at the root of the evil. These men induce the labourers by false promises and 
delusive prospects to leave, and then sell them to some other planter’. Tiroumoudy, of 
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the Bon Espoir plantation, Riviere du Rempart, concurred, noting the he lost three 
bands of men, two because a man in the group wanted to be sirdar. He thus lost a band 
from Calcutta, a group of Brahmins from Bombay. And one because the workers wanted 
higher terms than he was prepared to offer. He noted that he had one band whose 
engagements are about to expire and that ‘a strange sirdar from the neighbourhood has 
been among them trying to persuade them to re-engage elsewhere … Many sirdars make 
a regular trade of this kind of embauchage. They receive either a reward of high wages 
for themselves and in addition a rupee a head for each man whom they engage’. 62 Whilst 
alleging that the sirdars were the principal beneficiaries, a petition of planters in 1847 
made similar complaints: ‘older sirdars further establish great dominion over these men 
by advances of money at enormous interest... At the end of their engagement, by this 
singular authority they take away their bands, which they invariably sell to those who, in 
extremity, for want of hands, readily give a large sum.’63 
 
A complex picture of the informal relationships of trust between labourer and 
sirdar/kangani and planter and of both with the government can be teased out from 
these sources. Malpractice was bound to exist, but it is important not always to take the 
occurrence of it in colonial archives at face value: the maligning of intermediaries is not 
necessarily representative of the reality, and it is crucial to assess how we know about 
cases of ‘breach of trust’ and the conditions in which they come to light. Multiple ways to 
read the archive are exemplified in the documentation of ‘crimping’ or ‘abduction’ of 
labour by intermediaries, depending on the perspective of accuser and accused. Above 
all, it is important to remember that informal relationships were carried on for the most 
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part invisibly and with mutual benefit and are only documented in colonial archives 
when they go wrong. A naive use of such sources will tend to exaggerate the role of the 
colonial administration and underestimate the extent to which migrants were able to 
manage their affairs themselves. 
 
Conclusions 
The contractual arrangements of indentured migration have been recognized as an 
effort to regulate labour conditions. 64  Nevertheless, the formal structures regulating 
the mobilization of workers and their status on estates are only part of the story. The 
informal networks of trust which developed between labourers, intermediaries and 
employers are clearly crucial to the effective maintenance of economic relationships and 
were often more harmonious than official archives and the historical literature might 
suggest. Trust requires more than the correct application of mutually agreed contractual 
arrangements; knowledge and information were an integral part of the process, and in 
these grey areas, intermediaries play an important and often unacknowledged role.  
The colonial archive carefully documents the efforts made by officials, cynically 
or otherwise, to engender trust in the official system of indentured recruitment and 
employment. At the same time, it offers glimpses into the vast pyramid of informal 
relationships by which labourers were apprised of opportunities overseas, organised to 
migrate in gangs of labourers from the same locality, and through which they managed 
their relationships with employers overseas. By means of correspondence and word of 
mouth, often carried by returnees, sirdars and kanganis, a vital channel of knowledge 
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and information was funnelled to recruits. In the overseas context, collective action, 
often organised or fronted by sirdars / kanganis was initiated to mitigate exploitative 
behaviour by planters and officials. The influence that intermediaries held over workers 
was at times attacked by employers who sought to use the machinery of the state – law-
makers and law-enforcers – to reassert their control over labour. In many cases, money 
and power were weapons used against labour to subvert intermediaries to act in the 
interests of employers; at other times all parties benefited from the parallel systems of 
formal and informal management of indenture and supported their continuance. In 
practice, therefore, informal networks of trust were integral and indispensable for the 
successful operation of the system of indentured overseas migration.  A great many 
collective efforts by workers and their sirdars to manage their work experience were 
successful and unreported in the colonial archive. These affective relationships seem to 
have had a profound influence over the process and structure of indentured labour 
migration.  To uncover this aspect we need to read carefully against the grain of colonial 
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